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This paper revisits the no-attachment assumption in job search models with
random productivity ﬂuctuations and Nash-bargaining. Both workers and ﬁrms
value the option to remain in attachment: ﬁrms proﬁt from a reduced hiring cost,
while workers gain from a higher reservation wage when bargaining with a new
employer. Ex-post differentiation of workers into attached and unattached unem-
ployed produces endogenous binary wage dispersion. The decentralized equilib-
rium with a Hosios value of the bargaining power is no longer constrained efﬁ-
cient: when changing attachment workers impose a negative externality on their
former employer originating from a loss of the recall option. This inefﬁciency
tends to produce excessive job creation. The paper also investigates returns to job
mobility in Germany and shows that being recalled to the previous employer as
opposed to the new job is associated with about 8% lower probability of wage
improvement.
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11 Introduction
The process of job destruction is well understood and incorporated into the models
of job search. The seminal work in this ﬁeld is accomplished by Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994) with the following studies by Pissarides (2000), Bontemps, Robin and
Van den Berg (2000) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a). The general framework
for the analysis of job destruction builds up on the mechanism of permanent, inde-
pendent and idiosyncratic productivity shocks inducing agents to separate. As a result
of the negative productivity shock jobs are destroyed while workers are unemployed
and search for a new employment. Nevertheless the common assumptionof permanent
separations and memorylessbehaviorof workers and ﬁrms contradicts theexistingem-
pirical literature. Mavromaras and Rudolph (1998) show that 26.5% of the individuals
ﬁnding employment in Germany are recalled to their former employers (table 1).
Study Results Sample (spells) Country
K. Mavromaras, Recalls: 26.5% N=22601 (L) Germany
H. Rudolph (1998) 1980-1990
G. Fischer, Recalls: 32.4% N=2499 (T) Austria
K. Pichelmann (1991) AU: 22.2% 1985
A. Alba-Ramirez, J. Arranz, Recalls: 35.7% N=23035 (L) Spain
F. Munoz-Bullon (2007) 1999-2002
P. Jensen, Recalls: 50% N=35000 (T) Denmark
M. Svarer (2003) AU: 20% 1981-1990
F. Jansson (2002) Recalls: 40-47% N=3668 (T) Sweden
AU: 10% 1995-1996
K. Roed, Recalls: 32.2% N=815373 (T) Norway
M. Nordberg (2003) AU: 13.3% 1989-1998
AU – attached unemployment; L – layoff unemployment; T – total unemployment;
Table 1: Summary of empirical research on temporary layoffs (Europe)
Similar frequencies of recalls are registered in Austria and Spain being respectively
32.4% and 35.7%. Even higher recall ratios are estimated in Scandinavian countries
ranging from 32.2% in Norway to about 50% in Denmark. In addition, empirical
relevance of temporary layoffs is supported by the fractions of attached unemployed
(expecting a recall) in the pool of unemployed workers. These ratios range from ap-
2proximately 10% in Sweden to 22.2% in Austria. Temporary layoffs are also a wide-
spread phenomenon in the U.S. According to the data of the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics for the period 2000-2007, approximately 1 million of registered unemployed
in the U.S. expect to be recalled to their former employers1. This corresponds to the
ratios of 13.6% of total unemployment and 26.4% of layoff unemployment in the U.S.
Following the empirical evidence this study considers the problem of temporary lay-
offs in a model of job search. The starting point of this paper is to introduce temporary
productivity shocks and worker-ﬁrm attachment into the search and matching frame-
work of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), where search is random and undirected and
wages are set via the Nash bargaining. Bargaining as a wage determination mechanism
is supported on the empirical level, e.g. using the data from Princeton Data Improve-
ment Initiative for the year 2008 Hall and Krüger (2008) ﬁnd that about a third of
all workers in the sample bargained with their current employers rather than treated
their job offer as take-it-or-leave-it. Further, this study considers wage contracts with
limited commitment and allows for wage renegotiations if either of the participation
constraints is binding.
Conditionally on productivity shocks being sufﬁciently severe for the threat of lay-
off to be credible there are two different equilibria. The ﬁrst equilibrium obtains at
low variation in productivity, the layoff threat is then eliminated by wage renegotia-
tion implying a wage reduction after the ﬁrst production spell. The second equilibrium
with temporary layoffs obtains at high productivity variation and is in the focus of the
present study. First of all, search costs incurred by ﬁrms as well as a temporary na-
ture of productivity ﬂuctuations mutually motivate the worker-ﬁrm attachment upon a
separation. Nevertheless, worker’s attachment is incomplete, since workers search for
new job alternatives during the low productivity spells. Both workers and ﬁrms gain
from their attachment. Firms obtain a valuableoption to recall the worker, while work-
ers gain from an additional possibility to be recalled. There is also a second gain for
the workers: attached unemployed have a higher reservation wage than the unattached,
which means they can bargain a higher wage when contacted by a new employer.
The ex-post differentiation of reservation wages among attached and unattached un-
employed produces a binary wage distribution in the equilibrium. The model can thus
contribute to the debate on endogenous wage dispersion following the seminal study
1Individuals on a temporary layoff are deﬁned as those "who have been given a date to return to
work or who expect to return within 6 months", U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbookof Methods,
Chapter 1, available at www.bls.gov/opub/hom
3by Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
Furthermore, this study conﬁrms theoretical predictions of the model using the data
from the German Social-Economic Panel for the years 2003-2007. The probit regres-
sion model shows that workers recalled to their previous employer face approximately
8% lower probability of wage improvement compared to those ﬁnding a job with a
new employer. This means that the worker-ﬁrm attachment and recalls have signiﬁcant
predictive power for wage changes and therefore provide an additional explanation of
wage heterogeneity in Germany. Other signiﬁcant explanatory variables include age of
the individual, the reason for separation as well as comparison of job characteristics.
This study shows that voluntary separations are associated with 6.5% higher proba-
bility of wage improvement upon a job change, at the same time the probability is
8.2% lower in the case of involuntary separation. Moreover, additional beneﬁts, better
promotion possibilities and improved job security are positively associated with wage
gains.
Finally, this study considers welfare properties of an economy with search frictions
and temporary layoffs. I ﬁnd that the decentralized equilibrium with temporary layoffs
is constrained inefﬁcient even if search externalities are internalized. Hosios (1990)
showsthat search externalities are an inherent feature of models with stochasticmatch-
ing and wage bargaining, since matching takes place before the bargaining, so that
wages do not perform any allocative or signaling function. This study shows that mu-
tual attachment of workers and ﬁrms upon a negative productivity shock introduces a
new source of the equilibrium inefﬁciency. The novel attachment externality results
from the fact that workers on a temporary layoff accepting new jobs do not internalize
the losses imposed on their previous employer. The previous ﬁrm is losing an option
to recall the former employee, which is immediately translated into a value loss, since
hiring is costly and time-consuming in the model.
To separate search and attachment externalities I set the bargaining power parame-
ter equal to the elasticity of the matching function. According to Hosios (1990) this
condition guarantees that search externalities are internalized. Then the decentralized
equilibrium with temporary layoffs is characterized by excessive job creation. Proﬁts
of ﬁrms hiring workers from attached unemployment are inefﬁciently high, so that too
many jobs are created in the equilibrium. This paper also shows, that efﬁciency of
the decentralized equilibrium may be restored by imposing an income tax on attached
4unemployment starting job with a new employer. The present value of tax payments
from a match should then be equal to the value loss of the previous employer of the
worker.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the litera-
ture while section 3 explains notation and the general economic environment of the
model. Section 4 presents a model with temporary layoffs and section 5 explains the
model with wage renegotiation. Section 6 contains welfare analysis of the decentral-
ized equilibrium with temporary layoffs while section 7 contains an empirical test of
model predictions using data from the German labour market. Section 8 concludes.
2 Overview of the related literature
There are a number of features relating this study to the existing literature. Originally
the theory of temporary layoffs has been developed in the implicit contract framework
represented by the studies of Baily (1977), Feldstein (1976, 1978) and Burdett and
Wright (1989). Feldstein (1976) considers the option of ﬁrms to reduce employment
versus the option to reduce working hours in response to random demand ﬂuctuations.
Workers are assumed to be permanently attached to the ﬁrm and receive unemploy-
ment beneﬁts if not employed. Unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a tax on ﬁrms
that is related to the previous beneﬁts collected by the ﬁrm’s employees (imperfect
experience rating). Feldstein (1976) shows that imperfect experience rating magniﬁes
the effect on employment of changes in demand and increases the change in employ-
ment relative to the change in average hours. Burdett and Wright (1989) allow ﬁrms
to choose both the number of workers under the contract (ﬁrm size) and the number of
workers producing output in a given period of time, so the model is characterized by
attached and unattached unemployment,thisproperties howeverare achieved at theex-
pense of assuming indivisible labour supply. Given this properties Burdett and Wright
(1989) show that the major result of Feldstein (1976) is reversed, so that an increase in
experience rating increases unemployment under reasonable conditions.
One-sided labour demand analysis of the implicit contract literature is extended to
consider the labour supply side of the market in the literature of job search. This is
represented by the studies of Burdett and Mortensen (1980), Pissarides (1982) and
Mortensen (1990). Burdett and Mortensen (1980) is the ﬁrst study to synthesize the
search and the implicit contract approaches. This study considers a labour market with
5an exogenous wage offer distribution where each job is additionally characterized by
a particular layoff probability. Moreover Burdett and Mortensen (1980) allow workers
to search on a temporary layoff, however search is costly implying a positive reserva-
tion wage for attached workers. Burdett and Mortensen (1980) characterize a retention
equilibrium where expected wage obtained by the worker is sufﬁciently high to pre-
vent the search in attachment. This is different from the current study where workers
search on a temporary layoff and change the attachment as soon as a new wage offer
is obtained. This property is achieved by the use of Nash bargaining in wage setting,
leaving positive rent to the worker.
Pissarides (1982) considers search behavior of workers in attached unemployment fac-
ing an exogenous wage offer distribution. The new feature of the model is that recall
probability is endogenous and is optimally chosen by ﬁrms. Pissarides (1982) shows
that workers search for an alternative job only if the probability of recall falls below
a critical level, and that ﬁrms may recall workers before the recovery of demand, de-
pending on the costs of laying off and hiring. Another study considering the problem
of temporary layoffs in a partial equilibriumframework is Mortensen (1990), who con-
siders a situation where workers search and receive wage offers both when employed
and unemployed and the worker’s productivity on any speciﬁc job is subject to con-
tinual stochastic disturbance over time. This setup provides explanations for job to
job transitions of workers as well as the phenomena of temporary layoffs and recalls.
The focus of Mortensen (1990) is on the effect of unemployment beneﬁts on worker’s
optimal search behavior, in particular he shows that both the incidence and duration
of unemployment increase with the UI beneﬁt ratio but the effect on the incidence
of attached unemployment is larger than that on the incidence of unattached unem-
ployment. This study differs from Pissarides (1982) and Mortensen (1990) in that it
considers endogenous wage setting obtained by bargaining between workers and ﬁrms
in the absence of on-the-job search and given a constant recall probability. The new
focus of the current study on wage setting in search equilibrium with temporary lay-
offs permits analysis of an endogenous wage dispersion arising from the differences in
outside options of attached and unattached unemployed. In addition, this study allows
for agency problems in wage setting such as the limited commitment of workers and
ﬁrms as well as the two-sided resistance to unfavorable changes of wages.
6Wage dispersion is a well studied phenomenon arising in models with on-the-job
search. Originally wage dispersion has been documented in the studies of random
search with wage posting such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002b), Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004). Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) consider wage-posting in a labour market, where ﬁrms offering higher wages
gain from a reduced quit rate of the worker. In the equilibrium ﬁrms are indifferent
between offering a low wage and experiencing a high worker turnover versus a high
wage and a low worker turnover. This mechanism gives rise to a continuous wage
distribution among identical workers and ﬁrms. Burdett and Coles (2003) as well as
Stevens (2004) extend this approach by allowing ﬁrms to post wage-tenure contracts
and show that there exists a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage of-
fers. A similar result is obtained by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) who construct an
equilibrium search model with on-the-job search and allow employers to counter the
wage offers received by their employees.
The ﬁrst attempt to analyze features of a model with on-the-job search and Nash bar-
gaining has been done in Pissarides (1994). However, the simplifying assumption that
workers quit their previous job once a match with a new employer is formed does not
give rise to the endogenous wage dispersion. Shimer (2006) argues that in a model
with on-the-job search and strategic bargaining, the set of feasible payoffs is typically
nonconvex because an increase in the wage raises the duration of an employment re-
lationship. He further ﬁnds that the subgame perfect equilibrium of such a bargaining
model is no longer unique, nevertheless there exist market equilibria with a continuous
wage distribution in which identical ﬁrms bargain to different wages. Finally, Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) propose an equilibrium search model with strategic
wage bargaining, on-the-job search and counteroffers by competing ﬁrms. The cross-
sectional distribution of wages is then composed of three components: a worker ﬁxed
effect, an employer ﬁxed effect and a random effect, characterizing the most recent
wagemobilityoftheworker. Thisstudydiffersfromtheexistingliteratureonwagedis-
persion in that it does not consider on-the-job search by employed individuals. Instead
the focus of the present study is on search-in-attachment by unemployed individuals
on a temporary layoff. Thus the endogenous differentiation of unemployed workers
into attached and unattached gives rise to a binary equilibrium wage distribution.
73 Labour market modeling framework
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. There is a unit mass
of inﬁnitely lived workers and an endogenous number of ﬁrms. Workers and ﬁrms are
ex-ante identical, risk neutral and do not have access to credit markets. Both types of
agents are assumed to have short memory meaning that they only can keep records of
their latest attachment. Firms and workers share a common constant discount factor r.
There are two types of idiosyncratic productivity shocks in the model. Persistent pro-
ductivityshocks arrive at the Poisson rate γ and imply a permanent separation between
a job and a worker. As a result of the persistent productivity shock the job is perma-
nently destroyed and the worker becomes an unattached unemployed. Temporary pro-
ductivity shocks arrive with a Poisson arrival rate δ. Upon the temporary productivity
shock, the productivity variable ˜ y can take one of the two possible realizations {y,y0}
so that the following productivity switching rule applies:
˜ y =
 
y with probability p
y0 with probability 1 − p
where y > y0 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The initial productivity of a hired worker is assumed to
be high ˜ y = y. When the productivity realization is low ˜ y = y0, ﬁrms have an option
to use a temporary layoff, so that each job position can be either ﬁlled with a worker
and producing output, ﬁlled with a worker but neither producing nor searching (tem-
porary layoff) or vacant and searching for a worker. Workers on a temporary layoff are
referred to as attached unemployed, while jobs attached to a worker on a temporary
layoff are referred to as inactive. Workers on a temporary layoff do not receive wages
but are attached to the ﬁrm and may be recalled to continue producing.
Independent of the type of unemployment (attached or unattached) workers participate
in job search and receive an exogenous ﬂow value of leisure denoted by z. I assume
that search is costless for both types of the unemployed but the cost is prohibitively
high for the employed workers so that workers do not search on the job. Searching un-
employed workers ﬁnd a new job with theﬂow probabilityλ(θ), which is an increasing
function of its argument, where θ = v/u denotes the market tightness variable, u – the
unemployment rate and v – the vacancy rate. In contrast to workers, search is costly
for ﬁrms who pay a constant ﬂow cost of maintaining a vacancy – denoted by c – and
ﬁnd a worker at the corresponding Poisson arrival rate q(θ) = λ(θ)/θ, decreasing in θ.
8This follows from the standard assumptions concerning the properties of a matching
function: homogeneous of degree one, increasing and concave in both arguments u
and v.
Wages are determined via the concept of Nash bargaining and there is a single wage to
be deﬁned in the contract. Furthermore, it is assumed that a contract can commit the
two parties to future payments to be made while the match continues, however either
counterparty may terminate the contract at any time, hence contracts are characterized
by two-sided limited commitment. In addition, either counterparty has an option but
not an obligation to offer, reject or accept the terms for contract renegotiation. This
means that contract renegotiations may only take place as a result of a binding partici-
pation constraint for either of the contracting parties.
4 Search equilibrium with temporary layoffs
4.1 Decentralized equilibrium: workers
Suppose ﬁrst that the necessary condition for the existence of the equilibrium with
temporary layoffs is fulﬁlled, this condition is further derived in section 4.4. Denote U
– surplusofan unattached unemployedworkerand W 1 –surplusofa workeremployed
at wage w1 (hired from unattached unemployment or recalled). Bellman equations for
these two groups of workers are given by:
rU = z + λ(θ)(W
1 − U) (4.1)
rW
1 = w
1 − δ(1 − p)(W
1 − L) − γ(W
1 − U) (4.2)
where L denotes surplus of a worker on a temporary layoff, not producing and search-
ing for a job. Additionally, let W 2 denote surplus of a worker hired from attached
unemployment and receiving wage w2. Bellman equations for workers in attached
unemployment and those who changed the employer can be written as follows:
rL = z + λ(θ)(W
2 − L) + δp(W
1 − L) − γ(L − U) (4.3)
rW
2 = w
2 − δ(1 − p)(W
2 − L) − γ(W
2 − U) (4.4)
The labour market dynamics corresponding to the equilibrium with temporary layoffs
is presented in ﬁgure 1.
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Figure 1: Labour market dynamics
As follows from equation (4.3) surplus value L can be additionally written as:
L =
z + δpW 1 + λ(θ)W 2 + γU
r + γ + δp + λ(θ)
so that the surplus of an attached unemployed worker is increasing in the probability
to ﬁnd a new job λ(θ) and in the probability to be recalled back to the previous job δp.
Denoted2(θ) = λ(θ)/(r+γ+δp+λ(θ)) – conditionalprobabilityto exitthetemporary
layoffstateintoanewjob,similarlydenoted1(θ) = δp/(r+γ+δp+λ(θ))–conditional
probability to be recalled to the previous employer and d0(θ) = r/(r + γ + δpλ(θ)).
Then the surplus value of a worker on a temporary layoff becomes:
L − U = d0(θ)(Z − U) + d1(θ)(W
1 − U) + d2(θ)(W
2 − U)
where Z = z/r, which can also be written as:
L − U = d1(θ)(W
1 − U) + d2(θ)∆W (4.5)
where ∆W = W 2 − W 1, since it is true that d0(θ)(Z − U) + d2(θ)(W 1 − U) = 0.
Note here that d1(θ) is a decreasing function of θ and d2(θ) is an increasing function
of θ. Workers employed from unattached unemployment enter wage negotiations with
their employer and obtain wage w1 with a corresponding surplus value W 1. Similarly,
workers recalled to their previous employer sign a new labour contract but continue
receiving wage w1 since their outside option (unattached unemployment) remains un-
changed. Workers employed from attached unemployment enter wage negotiations
with their employer and obtain wage w2 with a corresponding surplus value W 2. It
10is assumed that attachment to a previous employer is destroyed as soon as a labour
contract with a new employer is signed, so that every worker can have at most one
attachment. This assumption implies that workers who were employed at high wage
w2 but experienced a spell of layoff unemployment obtain a lower wage w1 after they
are recalled.
4.2 Decentralized equilibrium: ﬁrms
Denote J1 – surplus of a job paying wage w1 (ﬁlled with a worker from unattached
unemployment or recalled). Additionally let T denote surplus of a job ﬁlled with a
worker on a temporary layoff. Bellman equations for J1 and T can be written as:
rJ
1 = y − w
1 − δ(1 − p)(J
1 − T) − γJ
1 (4.6)
rT = δp(J
1 − T) − λ(θ)T − γT (4.7)
Surplus value of an inactive ﬁrm T can be expressed in a simpliﬁed way:
T = d1(θ)J
1
Finally let J2 denote surplus of a job ﬁlled with a worker from attached unemployment
and paying wage w2. The Bellman equation for J2 is given by:
rJ
2 = y − w
2 − δ(1 − p)(J
2 − T) − γJ
2 (4.8)
which means that ﬁrms obtain net ﬂow proﬁts y − w2 and become inactive at the
Poisson arrival rate δ(1 − p).
4.3 Wage determination
Both wages w2 and w1 are determined via the concept of Nash bargaining. Consider
a worker on a temporary layoff negotiating with a new employer. Outside option of
such a worker is to remain in attached unemployment and search for another job or to
continue producing upon a recall from the previous employer, so that the rent of such
a worker is given by W 2 − L. The rent of a ﬁrm negotiating with an attached worker
is given by J2 − V , where V denotes surplus of an open vacancy. Wage w2 is then





2 − V )
1−β (4.9)
11where W
2 − L =
w2 − (r + γ)L + γU
r + γ + δ(1 − p)
and J
2 =
y − w2 + δ(1 − p)T
r + γ + δ(1 − p)
Here β denotes the worker’s bargaining power. Firms and workers treat values L and T
exogenously and in the equilibrium the free entry condition implies V = 0, this gives
rise to the following wage expression:
w
2 = β[y + δ(1 − p)T] + (1 − β)[(r + γ)L − γU] (4.10)
Now consider a worker in unattached unemployment negotiating with some employer.
Outside option of such a worker is to remain in unattached unemployment, so that the
rent of this worker is given by W 1 − U. The ﬁrm rent is given by J1 − V . Note that
this bargaining problem is the same for a worker on a temporary layoff recalled by his





1 − V )
1−β (4.11)
where W
1 − U =
w1 − rU + δ(1 − p)(L − U)
r + γ + δ(1 − p)
and J
1 =
y − w1 + δ(1 − p)T
r + γ + δ(1 − p)
Wage expression resulting from this optimization problem is then:
w
1 = β[y + δ(1 − p)T] + (1 − β)[rU − δ(1 − p)(L − U)] (4.12)
so that w2 −w1 = (1−β)(L−U)(r +γ +δ(1−p)). This means that attached unem-
ployed negotiatea higherwage w2 > w1 than the unattached dueto the fact that L > U
which also means that attached unemployed have a higher reservation wage since they
can be recalled to the their previous employer. Overall, attached unemployed negotiate
a higher wage w2 with a new employer as opposed to attached unemployed negotiating
with their previous employer.
Given the equilibrium wage equations (4.10) and (4.12) the tuple of surplus values
{U,T,W 1,W 2,J1,J2} can be expressed in terms of the total surplus S1 ≡ J1 +
W 1 − U and the total surplus S2 ≡ J2 + W 2 − L:
W
1 = U + βS
1 J
1 = (1 − β)S
1 (4.13)
rU = z + λ(θ)βS
1 T = d1(θ)(1 − β)S
1 (4.14)
W
2 = L + βS
2 J
2 = (1 − β)S
2 (4.15)
12In addition the surplus value L − U can be obtained from the following expression:
(L − U) = d1(θ)βS
1 + d2(θ)∆W
This means that a reduced tuple of variables {θ,S1,S2,∆W} is now sufﬁcient to char-
acterize surplus values {U,T,W 1,W 2,J1,J2}.
4.4 The free-entry condition
Necessary condition for the existence of the equilibrium with temporary layoffs re-
quires rents from a potential wage renegotiation to be negative, meaning that the pro-
ductivity value y0 should be sufﬁciently low. Otherwise workers and ﬁrms would
beneﬁt from sharing positive rents from renegotiation and continuing the production
process. To sum up, workers and ﬁrms separate upon a negative productivity shock, if
the continuation surplus is lower than the total surplus of a temporary layoff:
¯ y0 − rU
r + γ








0 ≤ y −
y − [rU + (r + γ)(T + L − U)]
r + γ + δ(1 − p)
(r + γ + δ) ≡ y
0
∗ (4.17)
where the left-hand side of inequality (4.16) stands for the surplus from continued pro-
duction, while the right-hand side is the surplus from temporary separation. Equation
(4.17) implies that the productivity value y0 should be low enough for the rent from
renegotiation to be negative. The equilibrium with an expectation of wage renegotia-
tion is described in the next section.
Now assume that condition (4.17) is fulﬁlled, this case gives rise to the equilibrium
with temporary layoffs and between-job wage dispersion. Denote α – probability for
a vacant job to be contacted by an unattached unemployed, so that 1 − α is the proba-
bility for a vacant job to be contacted by an attached unemployed. These probabilities




and 1 − α =
u2
u1 + u2
where u1 denotes a share of unattached unemployed workers in the economy and u2
denotes a share of the attached unemployed. Then the surplus of a vacant job paying
13the ﬂow cost c can be written as follows:
rV = −c + q(θ)(αJ
1 + (1 − α)J
2) (4.18)




1 + (1 − α)J
2 (4.19)
This means that the expected cost from an open vacancy should be equal to the ex-
pected ﬁrm surplus from a ﬁlled job. Denote e1 – share of workers employed at wage
w1 and e2 – share of workers employed at wage w2. Given that the total labour force
is normalized to 1 it holds that u1 + u2 + e1 + e2 = 1. Flow transition rates between
the four groups of workers are presented in table 2.
Table 2: Flow transition rates between states
State u1 u2 e1 e2
u1 – – λ(θ) –
u2 γ – δp λ(θ)
e1 γ δ(1 − p) – –
e2 γ δ(1 − p) – –
These transition rates correspond to the following system of differential equations in
variables u1, u2, e1 and e2:

    
    
˙ u2 = δ(1 − p)(e1 + e2) − δpu2 − λ(θ)u2 − γu2
˙ e1 = λ(θ)u1 + δpu2 − δ(1 − p)e1 − γe1
˙ e2 = λ(θ)u2 − δ(1 − p)e2 − γe2
u1 = 1 − u2 − e1 − e2
(4.20)
Each of the equations above implies, that change in a given state variable is equal to
the inﬂow of workers into the state minus the outﬂow of workers. The unique stable











e ≡ e1 + e2 =
γ + δp + λ(θ)













γ(γ + δ + λ(θ))
(4.23)
Probability α is a decreasing function of the market tightness θ. This means that a
higher job-ﬁnding rate λ(θ) reduces the number of unattached unemployed and there-
fore also the probability for a ﬁrm to contact an unattached worker.
To simplify the following representation of the model, denote s(θ) = γ+δ(1−p)(1−
d1(θ)) – endogenous job separation rate in the model. Job separations are due to a per-
manent productivity shock arriving at rate γ or due to a temporary productivity shock
arriving at rate δ(1 − p). In the state of a temporary layoff workers are not available
for a recall with a probability (1 − d1(θ)), so that the total separation rate becomes:
s(θ) = γ +δ(1−p)(1−d1(θ)). The job separation rate is an increasing function of θ,
since a higher probability of ﬁnding an external job for a worker on a temporary layoff
reduces the probability, that the worker is still available for a recall d1(θ). Using the








w1 − rU + d2(θ)∆W
r + s(θ)
=
y − rU + d2(θ)∆W
r + s(θ)
The resulting equilibrium with temporary layoffs is characterized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1: In the presence of negative rents from renegotiation, the layoff risk
is realized, the equilibrium is characterized by between-job wage dispersion and is
represented by a reduced tuple of variables {α,θ,S1,S2,∆W}, satisfying equation
(4.23), equations (a)-(c) below as well as the free-entry condition (d). The necessary
condition for the equilibrium existence is y0 ≤ y0
∗.
(a.) The total surplus value S2 is given by:
S
2 = S
1(1 − d1(θ)β) − d2(θ)∆W
(b.) The total surplus S1 is given by:
S
1 =
y − z + cθ + δ(1 − p)d2(θ)∆W
r + λ(θ) + s(θ)
15(c.) The surplus difference ∆W is given by:
∆W =
(1 − β)d1(θ)βS1
1 − (1 − β)d2(θ)
(4.24)
(d.) The free-entry condition deﬁnes θ:
c
q(θ)









The free entry condition (4.25) equates expected costs from creating a vacancy on
the left-hand side to the expected surplus of a ﬁlled job on the right-hand side. Note
that in the absence of worker-ﬁrm attachment the probability for the ﬁrm to contact an
unattached worker is α = 1, so that the right-hand side of equation (4.25) is simpliﬁed
to (1 − β)S1, which means, that ﬁrms obtain a surplus share (1 − β) of the total job
surplus S1. For 0 < α < 1 expression in square brackets in (4.25) is strictly smaller
than 1, which means that the expected ﬁrm surplus is less than (1 − β)S1. This is due
to the fact that ﬁrms hiring attached unemployed have to pay a higher wage w2.
Alsonotethatwagedispersioninthemodelisaconsequenceoftheinteriorvalueofthe
bargaining power 0 < β < 1. As follows from (4.24) β = 0 implies w1 = w2 = rU
due to the fact that U = L = W 1, so that neither employment, nor an attachment to
the previous employer is valuable for the worker. For β = 1 the situation is similar in
that w1 = w2 = y + δ(1 − p)T, so that workers obtain the full maximum rent of the
job and do not proﬁt from an additional attachment.
The ﬁnal step to characterize the model with temporary layoffs is to describe the prop-
erties of the Beveridge curve. The market tightness variable is deﬁned as θ = v/u,
where u = u1 + u2 – total unemployment rate in the economy. This means that
equations (4.21) deﬁne an implicit functional relationship between the number of open
vacancies v and the equilibrium unemployment u – the Beveridge curve:






γ(γ + δ + λ(θ))
 
, where θ = v/u
16Proposition 2: In the equilibrium with temporary layoffs and incomplete worker
attachment, the Beveridge curve is downward-sloping, in particular ∂u/∂v < 0 under






– elasticity of the job ﬁlling rate q(θ)






Appendix II shows that 0 < µθ < 1 if ηq < 1. Additionally, the elasticity of the







This means that a higher market tightness θ is associated with a higher number of open
vacancies v and a lower unemployment rate u.
5 Wage renegotiation in the presence of layoff risk
If condition (4.16) is violated, labour contracts are renegotiated upon a negative pro-
ductivity shock. This section characterizes an equilibrium with wage renegotiations.
Denote wL – new wage negotiated between the worker and the ﬁrm in the low pro-
ductivity state. Similarly denote wH – initial wage negotiated between a ﬁrm and a
worker upon hiring in the expectation of wage renegotiation. The corresponding ﬁrm
and worker surplus values are denoted JH and W H respectively. After the ﬁrst pro-
duction spell workers and ﬁrms bargain over a new wage wL with the corresponding
surplus values JL and W L:
(r + γ)J




L − U) = w
L − rU
Note that wage wL applies till the end of the employment relationship (including pe-
riods of high and low productivity) since worker’s threat to quit a productive ﬁrm into
unemployment is not credible. Outside options of a worker-ﬁrm pair are given by T








L = β[¯ y
0 − rU − (T + L − U)(r + γ)] + (r + γ)(L − U) + rU (5.1)
where the outside option values T and L can be obtained as:
T = d1(θ)J
H (L − U) =
d1(θ)(W H − U)
1 − (1 − β)d2(θ)
(5.2)
Above expression for wL is an optimal solution to the Nash bargaining problem be-
tween the ﬁrm and the worker as long as equation (4.16) is violated, meaning that the
total surplus from a layoff T +L−U is sufﬁciently low: (T +L−U)(r+γ) ≤ ¯ y0−rU.
Bellman equations for W H and JH are then:
rW
H = w





H = y − w




so that the surplus values W H − U and JH can be expressed as:
(r + γ + δ(1 − p))(W
H − U) = w
H − rU + δ(1 − p)(W
L − U)
(r + γ + δ(1 − p))J
H = y − w
H + δ(1 − p)J
L





H − V )
1−β
Given that in the equilibrium V = 0 expression for wH takes the following form:
w
H = β[y + δ(1 − p)J
L] + (1 − β)[rU − δ(1 − p)(W
L − U)]
= β[y + δ(1 − p)T] + (1 − β)[rU − δ(1 − p)(L − U)] (5.3)
The functional form of wH exactly coincides with the functional form of w1, this is
due to the fact that the net surplus in the low output state W L − L + JL −T is split in
the proportion β:
β(J
L − T) = (1 − β)(W
L − L) (5.4)
so that the initial labour contract is exactly the same ceteris paribus regardless of
whether wage negotiations will take place in the future or not. Nevertheless surplus
18values W H and JH are such that W H ≥ W 1 and JH ≥ J1 since workers and ﬁrms
expect to share the rents in the future.
Let SH ≡ JH + W H − U – total surplus of a new job and SL ≡ JL + W L − U
– total surplus in a low productivity state. Then Nash bargaining implies that:
W
H = U + βS
H W
L − L = β[S
L − (T + L − U)] (5.5)
J
H = (1 − β)S
H J
L − T = (1 − β)[S
L − (T + L − U)] (5.6)
rU = z + λ(θ)βS
H (5.7)
Equations (5.2) in a combination with (5.5)-(5.7) imply that search equilibrium with
wage renegotiation can be summarized as a reduced vector of variables {SH,SL,θ}
which is sufﬁcient to characterize surplus values {U,T,L,W L,JL,W H,JH}. Proper-
ties of the equilibrium with wage renegotiation are summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3: In the presence of positive rents from renegotiation the equilibrium is
characterized by within-job wage dispersion and is represented by a tuple of variables
{SH,SL,θ} satisfying conditions (a)-(c). The necessary condition for the equilibrium
existence is: y0 ≥ y0
∗.
(a.) The total surplus value SL is given by:
S
L =
¯ y0 − rU
r + γ
(b.) The total surplus value SH is given by:
S
H =
¯ y − z + cθ − δ(1 − p)rU/(r + γ)
(r + γ + δ(1 − p) + λ(θ))
where ¯ y = y + δ(1 − p)¯ y0/(r + γ).
(c.) The free-entry condition deﬁnes θ:
c
q(θ)
= (1 − β)S
H
The above equilibrium is characterized by within-job wage dispersion meaning that
workers with the same actual productivity y may be obtaining different wages wH
or wL depending on the history of their relationship with the employer. Denote eH
19– equilibrium share of workers employed at wage wH and eL – equilibrium share of
workers employed at wage wL. In the equilibrium it should be true that ˙ eH = 0 and
˙ eL = 0, so
0 = λ(θ)u − (γ + δ(1 − p))eH
0 = δ(1 − p)eH − γeL
Proposition 4: In the presence of layoff risk and positive rents from renegotiation the
equilibrium shares of workers employed at wages wH and wL respectively and the
equilibrium unemployment rate are given by:
eH =
λ(θ)u






γ(γ + δ(1 − p))
Denote αH – equilibrium fraction of workers employed at wages wH. In the presence







γ + δ(1 − p)
The equilibrium fraction αH is independent of the market tightness, and only de-
pends on the exact characteristics of the production process γ and δ. In the ab-
sence of temporary productivity shocks δ = 0, all workers obtain the initial wage
wH = βy + (1 − β)rU.
6 Social welfare and optimal policy
Hosios (1990) and further Pissarides (2000) show, that the Nash wage equation is not
likely to internalize search externalities resulting from the dependence of transition
probabilities λ(θ) and q(θ) on the tightness of the market. Nevertheless Hosios (1990)
proves that search externalities may be internalized, if the following condition is satis-
ﬁed: β = ηq, where ηq – elasticity of the job-ﬁlling rate q(θ). This section investigates
efﬁciency properties of the equilibrium with Nash bargaining and temporary layoffs
and shows, that the classical Hosios condition is not sufﬁcient for the constrained efﬁ-
ciency of the decentralized equilibrium. To obtain this result, consider the problem of








y(e1 + e2) + z(1 − e1 − e2) − cθ(1 − e1 − e2))
 
dt (6.1)
The social planner is subject to the same matching constraints as ﬁrms and workers,
therefore the dynamics of employment and unemployment is the same as in the decen-
tralized equilibrium:
˙ u2 = δ(1 − p)(e1 + e2) − δpu2 − λ(θ)u2 − γu2
˙ e1 = λ(θ)(1 − e1 − e2 − u2) + δpu2 − δ(1 − p)e1 − γe1
˙ e2 = λ(θ)u2 − δ(1 − p)e2 − γe2
The social optimum satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order condition:
c
q(θ)
= (1 − ηq)
y − z + cθ
r + λ(θ) + s(θ)
(1 − (1 − α)d1(θ)) (6.2)
The derivation of this condition is presented in appendix III. Comparing now the so-
cial condition (6.2) and the decentralized free entry condition (4.25) I ﬁnd that the




= α(1 − β)S
1 + (1 − α)(1 − β)S
2 (6.3)




1 − (L − U) = S
1(1 − d1(θ)β) − d2(θ)∆W
The equilibrium inefﬁciency comes from the fact that the ﬁrm and an attached unem-
ployed do not internalize the losses imposed on the previous employer of the worker.
In particular, the previous employer is loosing an option to recall the worker, with a
corresponding surplus value T. The social planner is taking this loss into account, so
that S2 = S1 − (T + L − U) = (1 − d1(θ))S1 in the optimal planner’s solution. This
externality imposed on the previous employer of the worker is not accounted for in
the bargaining process between the worker and a new employer, so that ﬁrms hiring at-
tached unemployed create too many jobs compared to the socially optimal level. These
results are summarized in the following proposition.
21Proposition 5: Let β = ηq < 1, then:
(a). Search equilibrium with temporary layoffs and wage dispersion described in
proposition 1 is constrained inefﬁcient;
(b). The market tightness in the decentralized equilibrium is above the socially opti-
mal level, implying excessive job creation;
Proof: The proof of part (b) of the proposition follows from the fact that:
β
1 − (1 − β)d2(θ)
=
β
β + (1 − β)(1 − d2(θ))
< 1
and ∆W > 0, so that S1 > (y − z + cθ)/(r + λ(θ) + s(θ)).
The next question addressed in this section is: which tax policy of the planner can
decentralize the efﬁcient labour allocation in the equilibrium? As shown above the
main source of the inefﬁciency of the decentralized equilibrium is surplus loss of the
previous employer of the worker resulting from worker’s decision to start a new job.
Throughout the paper it is assumed, that ﬁrms can observe worker’s attachment status
and so does also the social planner. This means the tax imposed on attached unem-
ployed taking on new employment should restore efﬁciency of the decentralized equi-
librium. Let τ denote an incometax imposedon attached unemployed startingjob with
a new employer and s – income subsidy for every worker. Bellman equations for W 1,
W 2, L and U are then modiﬁed in the following way:




1 + s − δ(1 − p)(W
1 − L) − γ(W
1 − U)
rL = z + s + λ(θ)(W
2 − L) + δp(W
1 − L) − γ(L − U)
rW
2 = w
2 − τ + s − δ(1 − p)(W
2 − L) − γ(W
2 − U)
Then the surplus difference ∆W is given by:
∆W =
w2 − τ − w1




(1 − β)d1(θ)S1 − F
 
1 − (1 − β)d2(θ)
(6.4)
where F denotes the present value of tax payments: F = τ/(r + γ + δ(1 − p)). Note
that from equation (4.14) it follows that T = (1−β)d1(θ)S1, where T is surplus of an
inactive ﬁrm attached to the worker. This means imposing a tax such that T = F will
22eliminate the real wage inequality: w2 − τ = w1. The surplus value S2 becomes:
S
2 = S
1 − (L − U) − F = S
1 − (L − U) − T = S
1(1 − d1(θ)) (6.5)
This equation in a combination with β = ηq (to internalize the search externality)
guarantees, that the market tightness in the decentralized equilibrium is set optimally,
and that job creation coincides with the solution of the social planner. The amount of
subsidies s is then obtained from the balanced budget constraint of the planner:
(τ − s)e2 = s(e1 + u1 + u2)
This means that the total net income ﬂow τ − s paid by attached unemployed starting
job with a new employeris distributedto the otherthree groups of workers e1+u1+u2.
This result is stated in proposition 6:
Proposition 6: Let β = ηq < 1. Welfare in the decentralized equilibrium with tem-
porary layoffs can be raised by imposing a tax τ on attached unemployed starting job
with a new employer, such that F = T = d1(θ)(1 − ηq)S1. This tax policy eliminates
real wage inequality w2 − τ = w1 and is equivalently written as:
F ≡
τ
r + γ + δ(1 − p)
= d1(θ)(1 − ηq)
y − z + cθ
r + s(θ) + λ(θ)
(6.6)
The balanced budget constraint of the planner implies that taxes are paid out as sub-
sidies s obtained from: s = τe2.
7 Empirical estimation
In this section a testable hypothesis based on the theoretical model from section 4 is
formulated and confronted with the statistical data. The model predicts that workers
on a temporary layoff recalled to the previous employer obtain low wage wt+1 = w1;
this result endogenously obtains in the model due to the bargaining process between
workers and ﬁrms since the outside option of a worker bargaining with a previous em-
ployer is to become an unattached unemployed. Wage w1 prevails in this case and is
independent of the previous wage of the worker wt. In addition, the model allows to
formulate an expression for the expected wage of a worker taking job with a new em-
ployer. With probability α the worker is an unattached unemployed and will bargain a
wage w1, but with probability 1 − α the worker is attached to the previous employer
23and has a higher reservation wage, so the contract wage with a new employer will
be w2. This means that the expected value of wage for a worker taking employment
withanew ﬁrm is: αw1+(1−α)w2. Thisallowsto formulatethefollowinghypothesis:
Hypothesis: For any value of the previous wage wt expected wage change ∆w of
an employee recalled to work for the previous employer is lower than the expected
wage change of an employee taking job with a new employer:
Et[∆w|Recallt+1 = 1] = E[wt+1|Recallt+1 = 1] − wt = w1 − wt
Et[∆w|New jobt+1 = 1] = αw1 + (1 − α)w2 − wt ≥ w1 − wt
To estimate the effect of recalls on wage changes I use the data from the German
Socio-EconomicPanel (GSOEP), a large micro-dataset administeredby the Deutsches
Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung. The sample covers the period of 5 years from 2003
to 2007 and includes the total of 7328 observations on job movers. The net of miss-
ing data sample contains 2595 observations. The wage change ∆w is coded in the
questionnaire as a dummy variable:
yi =
 
1 if∆wi = wit+1 − wit > 0
0 if∆wi = wit+1 − wit ≤ 0
(7.7)
so that the probit regression model is used to forecast the direction of wage changes.
Index i = 1,...,2595 here denotes the observation of wage change, while indices t and
t+1 are used to mark the previous and the new wage of the employee. The probability
of a positive change yi = 1 is then given by
P{yi = 1|Xi} = P{∆wi > 0|Xi} = Φ(X
′
iβ) (7.8)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution, β is the pa-
rameter vector and Xi – is the vector of explanatory variables of individual i. About
44% of the respondents in the ﬁnal sample have reported a wage improvement com-
pared to the previous job. Table 3 presents an overview of the explanatory variables.
Thelistofindividualcharacteristics consistsofthefollowingvariablesAge, Education,
German and Gender. Table 3 shows that the representative employee in the sample is
36 years old and has completed approximately 13 years of schooling, 93.8% of the
employees have German nationality and 52.4% of the employees are males. These
variables create an overview of the representative individual in the sample, at the same
time variables Education, German, and Gender are deterministic for the same indi-
24vidual so that their effect on the probability of wage improvement is predicted to be
insigniﬁcant. A number of empirical studies show that variable Age enters quadrat-
ically into the wage equation, meaning that wage is increasing with age up to some
maximum level and is decreasing thereafter. Variable Age for this reason is then pre-
dicted to have a negative effect on the probability of wage improvement.
Variable Mean Description
Dependent variable
Pay improved 0.443 1=Earnings have improved in the new job
Individual characteristics
Age 36.06 Age of the individual in years [18, ..., 68].
Education 12.81 Amount of education or training in years [7, ..., 18]
German 0.938 1=German nationality
Gender 0.524 1=Male
Previous job characteristics
Tenure 4.625 Number of years with a previous employer [0, ..., 43]
Recall 0.048 1=Returned to the previous employer
Reason for separation
Quit 0.404 1=Previous employment ended in a quit
Layoff 0.185 1=Previous employment ended in a layoff
Job closure 0.121 1=Previous employment ended due to job closure
Temp. contract 0.164 1=Temporary contract expired
Job comparison
Promotion 0.330 1=Promotion possibilities have improved in the new job
Beneﬁts 0.228 1=Social beneﬁts provision has improved in the new job
Security 0.262 1=Work security has improved in the new job
Table 3: Explanatory variables
The major variable of interest in this study is Recall, this variable takes value 1 if the
worker returns to the previous employer, and zero otherwise. In the original sample of
7328 observations recall rate is estimated to be 8.3%, but is reduced to only 4.8% in
the ﬁnal sample. The sign on the regression coefﬁcient of Recall should then be nega-
tive and signiﬁcant in order to support the above hypothesis. Variable Tenure measures
the individual’s experience with a previous employer. This variable traditionally has
positive effect on wages, but job changes are associated with a loss of the accumulated
tenure, so this variable is predicted to have a negative impact on the probability of
wage improvement.
The group of variables Quit, Layoff, Job closure and Temp. contract are included in
order to capture the "gains" from mobility. Note, that these variables are self-reported,
25speciﬁcally the respondents were asked "How did your previous job end?". Based on
this data, quits comprise the largest category and amount to about 40% of the ﬁnal
sample; about 30% of job changes are due to layoffs and job closures and only 16.4%
– are due to the end of a ﬁxed-term contract. The omitted variable Mutual separations
amounts to 12.6% of the sample and serves as a reference category. Variables Layoff
and Job closurecapture involuntaryseparations with a possiblespell of involuntaryun-
employment and are therefore expected to have negative effects. In contrast, variable
Quit captures voluntary mobility decisions and gains from possible job-to-job transi-
tions; this variables is therefore expected to have a positive effect.
The ﬁnal group of variables Promotion, Beneﬁts and Security are included into the
model to capture qualitative differences between the jobs. 33% of the respondents
have obtained a promotion in the new job, while only 23% have obtained additional
beneﬁts and 26% have claimed an improved job security. A negativesign of the regres-
sioncoefﬁcient on each ofthesevariables wouldimplysubstitutionbetween wages and
the respective job characteristic, while a positive sign implies complementarity.
Probit estimation results are presented in table 4. The second column of this table
contains coefﬁcients from the original estimation, while the reduced form regression
including only signiﬁcant variables is presented in the third column of table 4. A lower
number of variables allows to increase the number of observations (to 3241) and there-
fore the precision of the estimated coefﬁcients. The last column of table 4 contains
marginal effects of the explanatory variables, which can be interpreted as a change in
the probability of wage improvement corresponding to a unit change in the respective
explanatory variable. All of the explanatory variables in the sample, except Age and
Tenure, are binary variables, so the change in the probability of wage improvement
given a unit change in the explanatory variable Xij is given by:
∆P{yi = 1|X0} = P{yi = 1|X0,Xij = 1} − P{yi = 1|X0,Xij = 0} (7.9)
where X0 denotes characteristics of the representative individual:
X0 = {Age = 36,Recall = 0,Promotion = 0,Beneﬁts = 0,
Security = 0,Layoff = 0,Quit = 0,Bancruptcy = 0}
First of all, note that the Likelihood ratio test indicates an overall signiﬁcance of the
probit regression at 1% signiﬁcance level: LR = 528.14. Furthermore, variable Recall
26Table 4: Probit estimation results
Dependent variable yi = 1 if wage improvement in the new job
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard Reduced Standard Probability Standard
deviation form deviation change deviation
Constant -.059 (.240) -.030 (.155)
Age −.014∗∗ (.006) −.013∗∗ (.005) −.005∗∗ (.002)
Previous job characteristics
Tenure -.005 (.005)
Recall -.288∗∗ (.132) -.244∗∗ (.110) -.079∗∗ (.034)
Job comparison
Promotion .627∗∗ (.059) .638∗∗ (.052) .246∗∗ (.020)
Beneﬁts .620∗∗ (.067) .612∗∗ (.059) .235∗∗ (.024)
Security .217∗∗ (.064) .186∗∗ (.057) .068∗∗ (.021)
Reason for separation
Quit .264∗∗ (.084) .180∗∗ (.057) .065∗∗ (.021)
Layoff −.165∗ (.098) −.254∗∗ (.069) −.082∗∗ (.022)
Job closure −.266∗∗ (.111) −.340∗∗ (.090) −.107∗∗ (.027)
Temp. contract .091 (.100)
Observations 2595 3241 3241
Pseudo R2 0.1482 0.1415
Log likelihood -1518.3 -1911.2
Standard deviations are given in parentheses; Two-tailed signiﬁcance: * 10%, ** 5%;
Variables Education, German, Gender and year dummy variables are included
at the initial stage but not signiﬁcant at 10% signiﬁcance level.
is signiﬁcantly negative, meaning that recall to the job with a previous employer is
associated with 7.9% lower probability of wage improvementcompared to a job with a
new employer. These result supports the hypothesis of worker-ﬁrm attachment and its
implications for wages suggested in the theoretical part of this paper. To some extent,
this result is also anticipated in Burda and Mertens (2001) who have used a merged
German data sample from GSOEP and IAB (the social insurance data) to test for sam-
ple homogeneity including and excluding recalled individuals. Their ﬁndings show
that the Chow test consistently rejects homogeneity of the two samples.
Inline with the prediction, variable Age has negative effect on the probability of wage
improvement for job movers. Age of the individual is often seen as a proxy for the po-
tential experience, and so this ﬁnding is in accordance with the existing studies, i.e. for
Germany Dustmann and Pereira (2005) have found that "wage gains at job changes...
become negative towards the end of individuals’ careers." (p.18). A similar ﬁnding is
reported in Topel and Ward (1992), who ﬁnd that between-job wage gains decline with
27experience in the US.
The coefﬁcient on Tenure is negative but not signiﬁcant, meaning that the loss of job-
speciﬁc experience does not have effect on the probability of wage improvement. This
ﬁnding is not unique for Germany, for example, Dustmann and Pereira (2005) ﬁnd
insigniﬁcant tenure effect in wage growth regressions; this is however different in the
US, where Topel and Ward (1992) report that between-job wage gains decline with
prior job tenure. One of the explanations of this difference is presented in Dustmann
and Pereira (2005), who attribute the difference to a heavy use of apprenticeship train-
ing in Germany as opposed to the US. Apprenticeship training provides job-speciﬁc
knowledge to workers prior to their ﬁrst employment and therefore has a ﬂattening
effect on the ex-post wage growth of German workers.
Voluntary separations (quits) are associated with about 6.5% higher probability of
wage improvement, while involuntary separations reduce this probability by 8.2% in
the case of layoff and 10.7% in the case of job closure. At the same separations due
to the end of a temporary contract are not signiﬁcantly different from mutual separa-
tions, which are used as a reference category. These results are fully supported in the
empirical literature: Mincer (1993) ﬁnds that voluntary transitions in the US lead to
wage gains of between 10% and 20%, while Bartel and Borjas (1981) ﬁnd that layoffs
reduce wage growth overthe two-year period by about 19 cents per hour. For Germany
Burda and Mertens (2001) ﬁnd that full-time men displaced in 1986 and subsequently
reemployed in 1987 suffer a reduction of wage growth of about 3.6% when compared
with a reference group of continuously employed workers. Garcia-Perez and Rebollo-
Sanz (2005) ﬁnd that German workers tend to experience larger wage losses compared
to the rest of countries, around 22%, followed by French, Spanish and Portuguese
workers, who suffer wage losses of 14%, 10% and 9% respectively. Moreover, Garcia-
Perez and Rebollo-Sanz (2005) report that in France, Germany and Portugal voluntary
movers experience a small but positive return when changing jobs of around, 1% in
France, 2% in Germany and 4% in Portugal.
Finally, variables Promotion, Beneﬁts and Security have strong positive effects on
the probability of wage improvement. In particular, job promotion is associated with
24.6% higher probability of wage improvement, followed by 23.5% increase for addi-
tional beneﬁts and 6.8% increase for the improved job security. Table 7 shows empiri-
cal correlations of wages with the additional beneﬁts paid in Germany in 2003:
2813th Month Pay 0.44




Table 5: Correlations between beneﬁt payments and wages.
All of the beneﬁt variables are positivelyassociated with wages, in particular, strongest
correlations are attained for the 13th month pay (0.44) and for the proﬁt-sharing bonus
payment (0.32). For a more detailed theoretical treatment of the correlation between
wages and bonus payments see Chizhova (2008). These ﬁndings indicate strong com-
plementarity between wages and other beneﬁts in Germany, rather than substitution,
and mean that ﬁrms paying higher wages also tend to provide higher beneﬁts, better
promotion possibilities and improved job security to the workers. For the theoret-
ical explanation of the complementarity effect between wages and job security see
Chizhova (2007).
8 Conclusions
This paper develops a search model with stochastic idiosyncratic productivity shocks
and worker-ﬁrm attachments. The possibility to recall the previous attachment as well
as the temporary nature of productivity ﬂuctuations mutually motivate existence of
temporary layoffs in the equilibrium. This equilibrium obtains for large productivity
ﬂuctuations, sufﬁcient to induce a temporary separation, otherwise mutual agreement
on wage reduction between workers and ﬁrms eliminates the necessity for a layoff. In
the equilibrium with temporary layoffs attachment is incomplete implying that work-
ers search for better job alternatives during the low productivity spells. Ex-post dif-
ferentiation of unemployed workers into attached and unattached combined with Nash
bargaining produces a binary equilibrium wage dispersion. Here attached unemployed
bargain higher wages upon a match with a new employer as opposed to the unattached
unemployed. So the paper contributes to the debate on endogenous wage dispersion.
Furthermore, this papers investigates welfare properties of the decentralized equilib-
rium with temporary layoffs by comparing it to the solution of the utilitarian social
planner. As a result, the Hosios value of the bargaining power parameter does not
29any longer provide the constrained efﬁciency. The new type of the inefﬁciency in the
model is explained by the fact, that workers bargaining with a new ﬁrm impose a neg-
ative externality on their previous employer, who is losing a valuable option to recall
theemployeeupon agood productivityrealization. This attachmentexternalityis com-
plementary to the classical search externality described in Hosios (1990). In order to
separate the two effects I set the bargaining power parameter equal to the elasticity of
the job ﬁlling rate and show, that job creation is excessive in the decentralized equilib-
rium with temporary layoffs. Efﬁciency may be restored by imposing a tax on ﬁrms
hiring workers from attached unemployment.
Finally, theoretical implications of the model are tested against the empirical data us-
ing the German Social Economic Panel for the years 2003-2007. The probit regression
for wage gains shows that recalls have signiﬁcant impact on future wage changes of
workers. In particular, being recalled to the previous employer is associated with ap-
proximately 8% lower probability of wage improvement. This means that worker-ﬁrm
attachment and recalls provide an additional explanation of the observed wage hetero-
geneity in Germany. Other signiﬁcant variables employed in the estimation include
the reason for separation and job comparison variables. This paper shows that being
laid off from the previous job imposes 8.2% lower probability of wage improvement,
while voluntary separations (quits) increase this probability by 6.5%. Moreover, addi-
tional beneﬁts, better promotion possibilities and improvements in the job security act
as complements to wage gains.
9 Appendix
Appendix I: Proof of proposition 1.
The worker surplus W 1 − U can be written in the following way:
W
1 − U =
w1 − z + δ(1 − p)(L − U)
r + γ + δ(1 − p) + λ(θ)
since rU = z + λ(θ)(W 1 − U). Additionally, the ﬁrm surplus is:
J
1 =
y − w1 + cθ + δ(1 − p)T
r + γ + δ(1 − p) + λ(θ)
30this allows to obtain the value of S1 since S1 = J1 + W 1 − U. Additionally it is true
that T + L − U = d1(θ)S1 + d2(θ)∆W, then the total surplus S1 becomes:
S
1 =
y − z + cθ + δ(1 − p)d2(θ)∆W
r + s(θ) + λ(θ)
Now rewrite the free-entry condition (4.19) in the following way:
c
q(θ)
= α(1 − β)S





1 − (L − U) = S
1(1 − d1(θ)β) − d2(θ)∆W
From the wage setting equations (4.12), (4.10) it follows that:
∆W =
w2 − w1
r + γ + δ(1 − p)
= (1 − β)(L − U)
which allows to rewrite the surplus difference ∆W in the following way:
∆W =
(1 − β)d1(θ)βS1
1 − (1 − β)d2(θ)
so that the free-entry condition becomes:
c
q(θ)
= (1 − β)[αS
1 + (1 − α)S
2]
= (1 − β)S
1
 
α + (1 − α)
 
1 − d1(θ)β − d2(θ)
(1 − β)d1(θ)β
1 − (1 − β)d2(θ)
 
 





1 − (1 − β)d2(θ)
 
Appendix II: Proof of proposition 2.
The elasticity variable µθ can be expressed as follows:
µθ = [1 − ηq]
λ(θ)
γ + λ(θ)
k(θ) < 1, where
k(θ) =
γ(γ + δp + λ(θ)) + δ(1 − p)(γ + λ(θ))
λ(θ)
γ+δ+λ(θ)
γ(γ + δp + λ(θ)) + δ(1 − p)(γ + λ(θ))
< 1
31Appendix III: Social Planner
The current value Hamiltonian for the social planner problem is:
H = y(e1 + e2) + z(1 − e1 − e2) − cθ(1 − e1 − e2))
+ µ1
 








λ(θ)u1 − δ(1 − p)e2 − γe2
 
where µ1, µ2, and µ3 are costate variables corresponding to u1, e1, and e2 respectively.
The optimal social planner solution must satisfy:
∂H
∂θ
= 0 ⇒ −(1 − e1 − e2)c =
=
 






= rµ1 ⇒ −µ1(δp + λ(θ) + γ) + µ2(λ(θ) + δp) =
= µ3λ(θ) + rµ1 (9.2)
∂H
∂e1
= rµ2 ⇒ y − z + cθ + µ1δ(1 − p) − µ2λ(θ) =
= µ2(δ(1 − p) + γ) + rµ2 (9.3)
∂H
∂e2
= rµ3 ⇒ y − z + cθ + µ1δ(1 − p) − µ2λ(θ) =
= µ3(δ(1 − p) + γ) + rµ3 (9.4)




= (1 − ηq)
 
(1 − α)(µ2 − µ1) + αµ2
 
y − z + cθ = µ2(r + γ + λ(θ)) − (µ1 − µ2)δ(1 − p)
where α = u/(u + u1). From equation (9.2) it follows that µ1 = d1(θ)µ2, so
µ2 =
y − z + cθ
r + λ(θ) + s(θ)
32Finally, the optimal market tightness is obtained from:
c
q(θ)
= (1 − ηq)
y − z + cθ
r + λ(θ) + s(θ)
(1 − (1 − α)d1(θ))
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